Introduction
Vigorous and sustained socio-economic development has been a major, but elusive, From Table 1 it can be seen that the economic growth performance of Pacific island states in recent times has been much weaker than that of comparable groups and regions. For example, at 2.6% per annum, Fiji's average rate of growth in real GDP per capita over the [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] period was among the highest recorded by these island economies, yet it was still much lower than the corresponding average for the 'Lower ADB forecasts for and 2009 (ADB, 2008 , and similar projections for future years, suggest a continuing bleak outlook for Pacific island states. This naturally raises the question of how the growth performance of these economies can be improved. The question has been not only a concern for policy makers in these countries, but also a matter of considerable interest to multilateral organisations such as the World Bank, UNDP, IMF, and ADB, and to the governments of leading countries and regional powers, such as the US, UK, Japan, China and Australia. Historically, Pacific island economies have received sizable amounts of development assistance, often linked to the adoption of recommended policy measures. Yet, as summarised in ADB (2004) , these efforts appear to have yielded little success.
In recent times, a number of governments in the region have taken steps to reform systematically their economies. The overall strategy has been to follow the example of other countries and pursue market-oriented solutions, such as the corporatisation and privatisation of public utilities, the reduction of barriers to international trade, civil service reforms, and tax reforms (ADB, 1999; Reddy et al., 2004) . Unfortunately, these reforms have also not resulted in much success.
Some analysts have suggested that a key to sustainable and strong economic growth in the future would be a robust and vibrant private sector (e.g. ADB, 1999 ADB, , 2004 . The ADB also identifies the financial system as a crucial ingredient for the development of such a vigorous private sector. For South Pacific island states, a strong financial system is more or less synonymous with a strong banking sector, as commercial banks typically account for around one-half of the total assets of all financial institutions (ADB, 2001) . 2 As for equity financing, stock markets exist in only two of these island states-Fiji and Papua New Guinea-and even here they are not very significant, due to extremely low trading activities. In the case of Fiji, for example, the total value of stock traded annually was only approximately 0.10% to 0.30% of GDP in the period 1997-2005 compared with 23% to 65% in Malaysia, 40%
to 84% in Australia and 60% to 100% in Singapore (Beck et al., 2007) 3 Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to investigate how banking development in Fiji and neighbouring island economies could be enhanced -in particular, to what extent such enhancement would depend on a strengthening of legal institutions. To this end, the paper will address the following specific questions:
. It follows that the development of the banking sector will probably be a major component of any accelerated development of the financial system as a whole.
1. How strong are the legal rules protecting creditor rights in Fiji? From the banks'
perspective, has such strength or weakness facilitated or hindered the provision of credit to the private sector? The paper is organised as follows. The next section outlines the conceptual framework supporting our analysis and briefly reviews some antecedents in the literature. Sections 3 and 4 then deal with questions (i) and (ii) above, respectively, while Section 5 focuses on the measurement of banking development and on international comparisons of such measures, in order to address question (iii). We then explore, in Section 6, the general relationships between legal institutions and banking development. Section 7 considers the role of legal institutions in the enhancement of the banking sector in Fiji. Finally, Section 8 concludes with a summary of the main points raised in the paper and their implications for other developing economies in the South Pacific.
Conceptual issues
In a summary of recent research, Levine (1997) states that '…broad cross-country comparisons, individual country analyses, and firm-level investigations point in the same direction: the functioning of financial systems is vitally linked to economic growth' (p689-70). Indeed, proponents of the Finance-Economic Growth nexus have highlighted the role of the financial system in mobilising savings, facilitating investment and technological innovation, and promoting productivity and economic growth. Some authors have also argued that, while causality may run in both directions, there has been increasing evidence that financial development causes economic growth rather than the reverse (see, for example, Levine, 2005) . Although the latter point remains contentious (see, for example, Meier and Seers, 1984; Lucas, 1998; Calderon and Liu, 2003) , there is little dispute over the suggestion that a strong financial system is helpful to economic growth and development.
This immediately raises the question of how financial development can be promoted or accelerated. Evidently, development could result from the enhancement of either the supply or the demand for organised finance, or both. This paper focuses on the former. In this connection, a recent and growing strand of literature has emphasised the importance of legal protection for creditors as a key determinant of the supply of funds. Advanced by La Porta et al. (LLSV, 1998) and others, the Law-Finance theory sees adequate investor protection as a pre-requisite for a dependable supply of funds.
Such protection encompasses both the mandating of legal rights and the appropriate enforcement of these rights-this paper will refer to both as 'legal institutions'. Some proponents of the Law-Finance theory (including LLSV, 1998) hold that a country's legal institutions are fundamentally shaped by the origin or tradition of its laws, but this view is not shared by other supporters of the theory, such as Rajan and Zingales (2003b) , Licht et al. (2001) , and Acemoglu et al. (2001) .
Given the increasing prominence of the Law-Finance theory, it is of interest to consider its applicability to Fiji and, by extension, to other South Pacific island states.
At one level, the investigation can be motivated by reference to a possible lawfinancial development -private sector development -economic growth nexus which may open up new ways to promote growth. At another, the analysis of financial development and its determinants is, per se, a perfectly legitimate topic of enquiry and research. Despite the important work of LLSV (1998), Levine (1998 , 1999 ), ADB (2001b , 2005 , Chand (2002) , Waqabaca (2000 Waqabaca ( , 2004 , and others, there remains a relative scarcity of information relating to this topic in a Pacific islands context, and it is timely to make a contribution toward filling this gap. According to the Law-Finance theory, a country's legal institutions play a major role in determining the level of financial development in that country. In this specific case, the theory implies that legal rules and/or the quality of law enforcement in Fiji would be major determinants of the level of banking development in the country, as shown in the upper part of the figure. 4 In turn, proponents of the Finance-Economic Growth theory would expect banking development (and, more generally, financial development) to influence economic development at a broader level, as shown in the lower part of the figure. The broken lines illustrate an alternative (but not necessarily mutually exclusive) view-namely, that the state of broader socio-economic development may be an important determinant of banking development, both directly and indirectly (via its influence on the quality of law enforcement). This view will be discussed in greater detail in Section 6. In the meantime, we must turn first to an analysis of the strength of legal rules which protect creditor rights in Fiji. aggregated to obtain a creditor rights index (CRI) that ranges from 0 to 4, with higher scores indicating stronger levels of legal protection for creditors.
It is recognised that the zero-one approach to quantifying the strength of individual legal rules is subject to some limitations, such as the inability to pick up fine, subtle movements over time, or relatively small variations across national jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, it represents an important first step toward allowing researchers-such as LLSV (1998), Levine (1998) In terms of legal origin, Fiji falls within the 'English' group, whose members have typically enacted strong legal rules to protect creditor rights: the group's average CRI score (3.11) is the highest of all groups shown. With a CRI score of zero, Fiji not only contrasts sharply with other countries in its English-tradition group, but also compares unfavourably with countries in other groups, including those with relatively low CRI scores, such as the French-tradition group (1.58, the lowest of the group averages).
In terms of income classification, Fiji is a 'Lower Middle Income' country. Its CRI score is again far below the average of this group -indeed it is below the average of any group and of the sample as a whole. It is interesting to note that, in this sample, all of the 'Low Income' countries happen to have English legal traditions, and it turns out that they all have the strongest level (4) of creditor protection rules.
There is some evidence from both panels of Table 2 that in countries where creditors enjoy strong protection through legal rules that explicitly safeguard their rights, less emphasis tends to be placed on the use of RESERVE as an alternative means to provide such protection. For example, in Panel B the 'Low Income' group has the highest possible CRI score (4.0) and the lowest possible RESERVE score (0). In the same vein, in Panel A the French-tradition group has the lowest CRI score (1.58) and a relatively high RESERVE score (0.85). However, this negative correlation does not always hold: in Panel A, for example, the German-tradition group has a higher score for both CRI and RESERVE than the French-tradition group.
Perceptions regarding the role of legal rules in Fiji
Due perhaps to data availability, existing studies have tended to focus on analysing the legal rules protecting creditors in each country and to overlook the views and opinions of creditors themselves. Yet, as Rodrik (2000) points out, best-practice 'blueprints'
may not work in all situations and often participatory processes for aggregating 'local knowledge' are more effective tools for institution building in individual countries. In contemplating possible amendments to legislation protecting creditor rights, it would seem reasonable to gain an understanding of the views and opinions of the creditors themselves. Thus, it may be worthwhile to work toward redressing the above imbalance. This sub-section investigates whether banks in Fiji, a major group of creditors in the country, are very concerned over the fact that they do not enjoy the protection provided by a number of legal rules that apply in some other countries.
Data source
Data for this purpose were gathered via an opinion survey conducted in 2006. A structured interview schedule, using a Likert scale, was employed. In what follows we focus on those parts of the survey which relate to banks' views regarding the importance of the nominated legal rights for the provision of private sector credit in Fiji.
The relevant respondents in this instance are 14 key personnel from the 5 commercial banks in the country.
These respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 (major obstacle) to 7 (no obstacle) the legal problems they experienced in relation to each aspect of creditor rights (STAY, RANK, CONSENT, MANAGE and RESERVE). For instance, in relation to STAY, the question was: 'How would you rate the legal problems associated with repossession of debt collateral?' Given that automatic stay was not legally mandated in Fiji, a 7 response here would indicate that, from the respondent's point of view, the relevant bank did not have any problems in repossessing collateral despite the absence of this particular legal rule. Conversely, a score of 1 would indicate that this absence was a major obstacle. In general, a higher score on each of these survey variables would indicate a more favourable rating from the viewpoint of banking development.
In parallel with the composite index CRI above, the ratings for the four 'core' aspects (STAY, RANK, CONSENT and MANAGE) are combined via simple averaging to yield an overall rating for these aspects. This aggregated rating also ranges from 1 to 7. Thus, an aggregated score of 1 would indicate that the respondent saw the absence of the relevant legal rules as a major obstacle to advancing credit to the private sector, and a score of 7, that the respondent did not see such absence as any hindrance at all.
Results
In Table 3 , the survey results are reported for large and small banks as two separate groups, as well as for all banks together. The results suggest that, as a combined group, banks are rather disappointed, but not greatly concerned, with the absence in Fiji of legal rules relating to the five aspects of creditor rights being studied. The mean scores tend to be rather close to 4, the neutral rating that indicates the issue is only a 'moderate' obstacle. Indeed, the only mean score below 3 is for STAY: at 2.8, this
indicates that the lack of the automatic right to repossess debt collateral is seen as a 'moderate to high' obstacle for banks in lending to the private sector. There is evidence that smaller banks are more concerned than larger banks about inadequate creditor rights. For example, ratings from small-bank respondents yield an average score of 3.0 for overall creditor rights across the four 'core' aspects (see column under 'CR' in the table) compared with an average rating of 3.9 given by respondents from large banks. Yet even among small-bank respondents, only one variable (STAY) receives a mean rating close to 2.0 (indicating a 'high' obstacle).
Quality of law enforcement
In this and similar studies, 'law enforcement' refers to the enforcement of laws and regulations in general, not just enforcement of the 5 legal rules listed in Section 3 above.
For example, Fiji has none of these rules, but does have many other legal means to protect creditors (such as those provided by the Bankruptcy Act) and these are enforceable.
Quantifying the quality of law enforcement

Approach
Following LLSV (1998), we differentiate between the following aspects of law enforcement: efficiency of the judicial system (EFJS), rule of law (RoL), corruption (COR), risk of expropriation (EXP) and the likelihood of repudiation by government (REP). In addition, the quality of accounting standards (ACT) is seen as a substitute or proxy in environments where formal law enforcement is weak.
In contrast to the assessment of legal rules, previous authors have tended to rely much more heavily on market participants' views and opinions in assessing the quality of law enforcement. For instance, LLSV (1998) use a 1-10 scale, 7 where a higher score indicates a more favourable rating. Thus, a score of 1 for a particular aspect of law enforcement would indicate that the respondent regards this aspect as totally flawed, while a score of 10 would indicate an assessment of perfect, or maximum, enforcement.
A score of 1 on EFJS, for example, would indicate that the judicial system is 'least efficient', while a 10 would indicate the 'most efficient' level. For COR, 1 = highest levels of corrupt practices, 10 = lowest levels. Similarly, for EXP, 1 = highest risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalisation of assets, 10 = lowest risk. Following LLSV (1998), the scores given by each respondent for the five 'core' aspects of law enforcement -namely EFJS, RoL, COR, EXP, and REP -are aggregated via simple averaging to produce a composite law enforcement quality index (EQI) which ranges from 1 to 10.
Data
Data for 49 countries other than Fiji are available from LLSV (1998). These data relate to indicators of perceived law enforcement quality in each country in or around 1993.
Data for Fiji were gathered from the same 2006 opinion survey described in Subsection 3.3. While the analysis in that section relied exclusively on responses from bank personnel, in this section we will consider responses from a wider sample of the community (reported below) as well as from bank personnel (not shown in detail, to conserve space). The wider sample contains responses from 334 respondents, including 14 bankers, 75 business firms, 230 existing and potential shareholders, and 15 independent knowledgeable individuals.
Quality of law enforcement in Fiji and other countries
Panel A of Table 4 compares the perceived quality of law enforcement in Fiji with the 49 LLSV countries categorised according to the origin of each country's legal system, while Panel B classifies the same countries by the World Bank's income criteria.
Although some caution must be noted regarding the strict comparability of scores obtained in different countries and at different points in time, the results do provide some indication of how Fiji's law enforcement compares internationally. Interestingly, the rating (also on a 1-10 scale) provided by Transparency International 8 In terms of legal origin classification (Panel A) it would appear that in almost all nominated aspects of law enforcement, Fiji receives scores that are lower than the averages for the various groups and for the LLSV sample as a whole. The gap between the sample average and Fiji's score is at its widest with respect to COR (corruption), where Fiji's rating is 3.6, compared with 6.9 for the sample as a whole. At the same time, the ratings suggest that on average communities in Fiji tend to regard the quality of law enforcement in their country as neither very high nor very low: most aspects receive mean scores between 5.1 and 6.2, yielding a mean score of 5.1 for the overall indicator. Corruption (COR) is clearly an outlier, with by far the lowest mean score. It is also noteworthy that the mean score for ACT is relatively high (7. higher than the average scores of both of these groups (3.8, and 4.1, respectively). Of course, COR still stands out as the weakest link in the country's overall enforcement quality: at 3.6, Fiji's COR score is considerably lower than the averages for the above two group (4.2 and 4.6, respectively). Remarkably, Fiji's ACT score (7.3) is higher than the averages for all income groups, including the 'High Income' group (6.6).
The above analysis has been based on responses obtained from all 334 respondents who participated in the 2006 Fiji survey -this helps to make the Fiji data as comparable as possible to the international data. Analysis has also been undertaken with the use of a more restricted set of Fiji data, namely the responses from 14 key personnel in the banking sector only. To conserve space, we do not report the results of such analysis in detail. It suffices to say that the ratings from bank personnel turn out to be quite similar to those from the public at large. On average, the ratings given by small-bank personnel tend to be lower than those given by their large-bank counterparts, but again the differences are generally not very large. increase over time is interpreted as evidence of greater, or more advanced, development.
A composite index for banking development
Each of the above ratios measures only one specific aspect of banking development.
Thus, it is useful to develop composite indices that would both conveniently summarise the available information and measure reasonably accurately the overall level of development in the banking sector. Our proposed approach is to construct a banking development index (BDI) that is a weighted average of the three component indicators.
In this regard, we differ from previous researchers, who have tended to rely on analyses of individual component indicators.
In line with the construction of CRI (Sub-section 3.1) and EQI (Sub-section 4.1) our standard set of weights is one where BANKY, BPRVY and LLY are each assigned an equal weight (1/3). It could be argued that one of the above aspects (e.g., activity as measured by BPRVY) should receive greater weight than the others. This, however, is likely to be a particularly contentious matter. Accordingly, we undertook a range of sensitivity analyses, with alternative sets of weights -one example of such a set is: 50% for BPRVY and 25% each for the other two variables. Overall, the results reported below are not very sensitive to moderate variations in weight allocation, e.g., to
the set of weights given in the above example.
Data
The data required for the construction of BDI are obtained from the 'Financial Thus, including Fiji, our data cover up to 55 countries across various income categories and geographical regions. Because of missing data, the actual coverage is typically more restricted, however. For the regression analysis in Section 6, for example, no missing data are permissible, and so the sample must be reduced to 47 (and in some instances, to 40) countries. For further details, see the appendix.
Banking development in Fiji and other economies
As Figure To conserve space, the table presents results mainly in the form of group averageswhere country-specific details are particularly relevant, they are highlighted in the text and/or in the accompanying charts.
From Table 5 , it can be seen that Fiji's performance in terms of banking development has been roughly on a par with the average of the other Pacific island economies being considered. As shown in Figure 3 , Vanuatu, Tonga and Samoa tended to keep pace with Fiji during much of the study period. By contrast, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands appear to have fallen behind after 1990. It should be noted that Vanuatu is a rather special case, in that its status as a tax haven has resulted in exceptionally high levels of LLY (bank liquid liabilities) despite unremarkable levels of BANKY and BPRVY. Income' countries, in that its BDI consistently remained above the average for this group, and the gap has tended to widen over time. Inspection of individual country data and time paths (not shown) confirm this observation. Perhaps of greater relevance to Fiji is a comparison with its own income group, the 'Lower Middle Income' group.
From Table 5 , it would appear that Fiji has performed about as well as, or only slightly less well than, the average for this group, and this is confirmed by inspection of Figure   4 and individual country data (not shown). In particular, while Fiji has not been able to keep up with Thailand, Jordan and Egypt, it has kept pace with Brazil and, in recent years, has outperformed the Philippines and Indonesia.
Similarly, from Table 5 and individual country data, we can observe that Fiji's banking development has generally been weaker than that of the 'Upper Middle Income' group, especially Malaysia and South Africa (neither is shown here). Further, it is evident that Fiji's performance has been much poorer than that of the countries in the 'High Income' group. Inspection of the individual country time paths suggest that, from about 1985, High Income countries (such as New Zealand, Australia, Japan and Singapore) continued to surge ahead, possibly due to financial deregulation in these countries and/or global technological changes. Over the same period, Fiji failed to keep pace with these countries and started to fall further behind. Indeed, this appears to have been part of a more general tendency for BDI levels in various countries and income groups to diverge, with banking development in richer countries surging ahead, especially in the last two decades, and poorer countries stagnating or developing at a much slower pace. 6
Legal institutions and banking development in general
In this section, we re-examine possible relationships between, on the one hand, banking development and, on the other, legal rules protecting creditor rights and/or the quality of law enforcement. It is recognised that some previous studies have found evidence to support the existence of such relationships (e.g. Levine, 1998) .
Nevertheless, it is of interest to revisit the issue at this time because of the availability of some new data, and because it is not clear whether the relationships would still hold if banking development were measured by a composite index (as we propose) rather than by individual component indicators as in most previous studies.
Legal rules and banking development
Data relating to the strength of legal rules protecting creditor rights (Table 2 ) and the level of banking development ( As noted above, RESERVE can be thought of as a proxy for creditor protection, in that countries with weak protection rules may ameliorate this shortcoming by requiring firms to maintain a minimum level of capital to avoid automatic liquidation (LLSV, 1998) . Thus, the prediction from the Law-Finance theory might be amended to refer to a possible relationship between RESERVE and BDI. Simple correlation coefficients and comparison of data tables, however, suggest that there is no strong and direct association between these two variables.
Quality of law enforcement and banking development
Data relating to the perceived quality of law enforcement (Table 4) were analysed in Section 4. The overall enforcement quality is represented by the composite index EQI.
Comparison of Tables 4 and 5 suggests that, as predicted by the Law-Finance theory, there may be a direct and fairly strong association between EQI and BDI. In particular, the quality of law enforcement tends to be higher in groups with higher income levels (Table 4) ; and these are also the groups which tend to enjoy better banking development performances (Table 5) (Table 6 ). A graphical illustration of this relationship is provided in Figure 5 , which shows observations of EQI and BDI as in 1995 for 47 countries. A priori, it would seem plausible that in such a relationship, the direction of causality runs more strongly from enforcement quality to banking development than vice versa, as the former (EQI) depends on broader and more fundamental characteristics of the society and economy, while the latter (BDI) depends on narrower economic and financial considerations. Nevertheless, in principle the possibility of causality running mainly from BDI to EQI cannot be ruled out. ACT (accounting standards) can be used as a proxy or substitute for enforcement quality, as countries with low enforcement quality may compensate for this by developing a relatively high ACT level. The simple correlation coefficients between ACT and BDI for 1995 and 2005 are 0.37 and 0.43, respectively, indicating a direct and significant association between the two variables (see Table 6 ). A priori, it is more plausible that causality runs from accounting standard to banking development than vice versa.
6.3
A multiple regression analysis
To allow for the possibility of relationships between variables that may appear as weak simple correlations in a bi-variate context but significant marginal effects in a multivariate context, we now turn to a multiple regression analysis (see Table 7 ). In Exploratory regressions (not shown, to conserve space) indicate that, in the presence of EQI and CRI as regressors, the variables RESERVE, ACT and lagged YPC do not exert significant influence on BDI. The lack of evidence supporting a role for the proxy variable RESERVE in determining banking development is not surprising, given the previous discussion regarding weak simple correlations between RESERVE and BDI. By contrast, both ACT (accounting standard) and YPC (income per capita level) are likely to have a direct relationship with BDI, and the fact that these relationships are not picked up by the regressions is due probably to their co-linearity with EQI (see Table 6 ) Regressions 1C and 2C in Table 7 are obtained after YPC, RESERVE and ACT are dropped as potential explanatory variables, with the sample size being maintained at 40 countries. It can be seen that both EQI (enforcement quality) and CRI (creditor protection rules) are significant determinants of the level of banking development in this 'compacted' sample. In Regression 1C, which relates to the 2005 level of banking development, the model is able to explain about 62% of the variations in the dependent variable, and both 'explanatory' variables are significant at the 1% level. In Regression 2C, which relates to banking development in 1995, the model's explanatory power is reduced to about 37%, and while EQI is still significant at 1%, CRI is only significant at the 10% level.
With YPC, RESERVE and ACT no longer being considered as potential regressors, data availability allows the sample size to be increased to 47: doing so yields Regressions 1E and 2E. In this 'extended' sample, EQI (enforcement quality) remains significant throughout as an explanatory variable, while CRI (creditor protection rules) is significant only at the 10% level for Regression 1E (which relates to the 2005 level of banking development) and is not significant even at this level for Regression 2E (explaining the 1995 level of BDI).
12
Estimates for Regression 1E suggest that, other things being equal, a one-point increase in EQI would result in an increase of approximately 18.24 points in BDI, while a one-point increase in CRI would produce an increase of approximately 4.70 points in BDI.
In Regression 1E, the model is able to explain about 64% of the variations in the dependent variable; for Regression 2E, this is reduced to about 40%.
13
These results are in broad agreement with the findings of Levine (1998) . In particular, Regressions 1C and 2C serve to confirm that key elements of the earlier findings (namely the significance of CRI and EQI) remain valid when the banking development variable is re-specified as a composite index (BDI) combining three aspects of banking development, rather than a single indicator (BPVRY) as in the previous study. Further, those key findings turn out to apply not only to the earlier study period (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) but also to a later period, as represented by the years 1995 and 2005.
Thus, although there is no significant simple correlation between CRI and BDI, it appears that the former variable may have a marginal impact on the latter, once the influence of EQI has been controlled for.
Yet there are also some substantive differences between our results and the findings of Levine (1998) . In particular, Regressions 1E and 2E indicate that the effect of legal rules (CRI) on banking development may be rather weaker and less robust than previously thought. This difference in findings can be explained, to some extent, by variations in the country coverage of the respective samples.
Our 'compacted' sample, which is the basis of Regressions 1C and 2C, differs from the Levine (1998) 
Further discussion: implications and caveats
On balance, the picture that emerges from the results presented above is one that is broadly consistent with the Law-Finance theory: both legal rules and law enforcement quality appear to be important determinants of banking development in a cross section of countries from around the world. Of the two legal institutions variables, EQI appears to have a more robust link with banking development than CRI. In practice, policy makers may also find it more feasible to make continuous, small improvements in the quality of law enforcement than to implement discrete, big changes in legal rules and codes.
Can this finding be taken as unambiguous evidence in support of the Law- Similarly, while it is clear that there is a very strong relationship between income levels and the quality of law enforcement (see Figure 6 and Table 6 ) it is not between banking development and income per capita levels (YPC, representing the level of economic development) the causality could run both ways in this relationship. It is plausible that BDI may determine YPC, for reasons cited previously in Section 2. But it is also plausible that YPC may determine BDI, in that higher income levels and living standards may result in a greater demand for, and may facilitate the development of, sophisticated financial instruments and markets.
clear in which direction the causality runs. It seems quite plausible that YPC may determine EQI, in that higher income levels and living standards may facilitate, and generate demand for, better governance in general and better law enforcement in particular. It is rather less plausible to assume that improvements in one specific social aspect (namely law enforcement) can drive, with equal strength and success, improvements in the general economy. In terms of Figure Because of continuing uncertainty over the direction of causality in the various relationships considered, caution should be applied when interpreting the results reported above. In particular, it should be recognised that, apart from the familiar LawFinance-Growth narrative, there is at least one other interpretation which also appears to fit the facts. According to this interpretation, economic growth is driven by a whole host of factors (some of which have not been included in the above discussion) but, in turn, economic growth is also a major driver of both law enforcement and banking development.
In view of the focus of this paper, we have followed the Law-Financial Development approach which highlights the possible role of legal institutions in facilitating and encouraging the supply of funds and, therefore, in determining banking development. As stated in footnote 4, however, we do recognise that other factors may also be important, especially those on the demand side. In the context of a developing economy such as Fiji, for example, aspects of culture and politics might well be critical.
These matters are beyond the scope of the present paper and are the subject of on-going research.
7.
Legal institutions and banking development in Fiji
Results from regressions based on international experiences suggest that both strong legal rules protecting creditor rights and high quality in law enforcement are associated with strong banking development performance. In applying these results to Fiji, it should be noted that the country rates very poorly in terms of the legal rules considered;
and that its enforcement quality is also fairly low by international standards. First, both regressions exclude the influence of ACT. As discussed above, simple correlation coefficients suggest the existence of a significant and direct association between accounting standards and banking development. The fact that ACT fails to remain significant in a multiple regression may well be due to its co-linearity with other explanatory variables, especially EQI (see Table 6 ). Given that Fiji's ACT score is far above the sample average, it follows that if the 'true' (unobservable) model included ACT, Fiji's actual performance would be boosted by this factor, so that it would typically be at a level higher than predicted by the estimated model. Fiji's actual performance and its model-predicted score.
In short, Fiji lacks a number of legal rules safeguarding creditor rights and receives only average ratings with respect to law enforcement quality. Yet in their operations, banks in Fiji have not been seriously hampered by not having recourse to the relevant legal rules. Further, the country is perceived to have high accounting standards which may have compensated to some extent for the above disadvantages, thus allowing the country to make better progress with respect to banking development than would otherwise be expected.
Policy implications
In view of the above, formal legal rules may not need to be strengthened as a priority, or a pre-condition, for further banking development in Fiji. As for the quality of law enforcement, even if it turns out that income level is a major determinant of such quality, there will be no harm in making a discretionary effort to improve quality as opposed to simply waiting for it to improve in line with rising income over time. This comment applies particularly to aspects of law enforcement, such as corruption control, that may be intrinsically beneficial. In addition, continued efforts to improve the country's accounting standards (ACT) may also be useful and would be readily feasible.
Conclusion
Prompted in part by the increasing prominence of the Law-Finance-Economic Growth literature, this paper examines the relationship between legal institutions and banking development in Fiji, with the expectation that any findings obtained are likely to apply to most other South Pacific island states as well. The primary aim of the paper is to contribute to knowledge about this particular aspect of socio-economic development in the South Pacific. In doing so, however, the paper also re-examines the international evidence surrounding the law-banking development connection in light of new and extended data.
In terms of the questions listed in Section 1 above, our findings are as follows. In order to gain an understanding of the above issues, we have collected some primary data for Fiji, and have compiled a number of indicators for it as well as for five of the neighbouring island states. Where possible we have analysed and compared such data with international trends and patterns. In particular, we proposed a composite index combining several individual indicators to measure banking development-sensitivity analyses suggest that our findings are robust with respect to moderate variations in the weighting scheme.
While the regression results reported in this paper are broadly consistent with the claims and earlier findings of proponents of the Law-Financial Development theory, the new results also suggest that one component of legal institutions, namely legal rules and codes, may be less influential in determining banking development than previously thought, especially in developing countries. This qualification to the conventional wisdom in this area may be of relevance to policy making in developing economies.
Our results suggest that it is the quality of law enforcement (rather than the formal rules codifying creditor rights) that should receive priority from policy makers in countries such as Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, and The remainder tends to be held by state-owned superannuation funds (20% on average), development banks (7%) and other institutions (25%).
4
It is recognised that bank depositors, as suppliers of funds to banks, also play an important role in banking sector development. Similarly, demand-side factors must not be overlooked. To maintain a tight focus for the present paper, however, these issues will be left to future research.
5
At the time, Fiji was under British colonial rule. Thus, Fiji is an example of a 'transplant' 'English Common Law' country with respect to legal tradition.
6
See the appendix for a list of countries used in the analysis for this paper.
7
The 1-10 scale is commonly used for this purpose; e.g. Transparency International also uses this scale.
8
Transparency International is an anti-corruption civil society organisation.
9
The sample of 47 countries includes the 49 countries from the LLSV sample, plus Fiji, minus Taiwan (for lack of banking development data) and Jordan and Venezuela (for lack of creditor rights data). For 2005, the sample further excludes Zimbabwe for lack of BDI data. For a complete list of countries in each sample, see the appendix.
12
It would, however, be significant if the significance level were raised to 13%.
13
Recall that EQI ranges from 1 to 10, CRI from 0 to 4, and the mean value of BDI is 78.55 in this instance.
14 See Table 6 . 
